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This article evaluates the potential of the current Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
agenda for addressing issues related to societal governance, which is defined here widely as 
“the various ways through which social life is coordinated” (Heywood 2002) p. 6). It suggests 
that (1) tackling governance challenges is crucial to addressing the impact of corporate 
activities; (2) current CSR and policy initiatives are entirely insufficient in addressing 
governance challenges; and (3) corporate activities may be contributing to governance 
failures.  
 
A number of authors have recently pointed to the importance of linking CSR to wider societal 
governance (Blowfield and Frynas 2005; Frynas 2008; Tallontire 2007). A number of recent 
empirical studies further point to the importance of addressing governance in CSR 
discussions. In their research on BP in Azerbaijan, Gulbrandsen and Moe (2007) suggest that 
a shift of focus from micro-level CSR activities towards macro-level governance issues is 
crucial in addressing the most important impacts of the oil and gas sector. Similarly, in her 
work on CSR initiatives in the coffee sector, MacDonald (2007, 793) found that the focus of 
CSR initiatives on the industry’s supply chains alone “has limited their ability to advance 
those dimensions of worker and producer wellbeing that are shaped by a range of state and 
non-state actors” outside the supply chains. This emerging literature suggests that, on the one 
hand, even the most enlightened and far-reaching CSR initiatives may face systemic 
constraints arising from the existing systems of societal governance and, on the other hand, 
the CSR movement must address governance challenges in order to remain relevant for 
addressing the crucial issues relevant to stakeholders. 
 
The investigation in this article focuses on the experience of the oil and gas sector, which has 
been among the leading industry sectors in championing CSR. In particular, we analyse the 
issue of revenue transparency, which has been the principal governance challenge addressed 
by multinational oil and gas companies. The investigation is based on interviews with oil 
company staff and insiders, as well as the analysis of twenty social and environmental reports 
of selected oil and gas companies. 
 
The governance challenge in resource rich countries 
 
While extractive industries such as oil and gas generate relatively few jobs and local 
economic linkages compared with manufacturing or services industries, they have been 
blamed for distorting national economies and undermining good governance. Many oil-
producing countries have suffered from the phenomenon known as the ‘resource curse’. 
Despite being well endowed with natural resources, oil-producing countries have experienced 
economic underdevelopment, political mismanagement and military conflict, a finding 
supported by many quantitative and qualitative studies and accepted by World Bank and IMF 
economists (Gelb 1988; Sachs and Warner 1999, 2001; Ross 1999).  
 
There are three principal negative societal effects of natural resource exports, which has been 
called the “resource curse”: 
  Impact on the economy. Large foreign exchange inflows generated by extractive 
industries exports lead to the appreciation of a country’s currency exchange rate, which 
makes it more difficult to export agricultural and manufacturing goods – a phenomenon 
known as Dutch Disease. Extractive industries also draw capital, labour and 
entrepreneurial activity away from non-resource sectors such as manufacturing and 
agriculture, thereby stifling the development of those sectors. Not surprisingly, it has been 
shown that resource-rich countries have had lower economic growth rates than countries 
without these resources over the long-term (Corden 1984; Sachs and Warner 1999, 2001). 
 
 Impact on governance. Extractive industries exports may undermine good governance 
and political accountability to society. Given their dependence on extractive industries 
revenue, governments in resource-rich countries may neglect non-resource taxation and 
may have fewer incentives to nurture other economic sectors and improve the quality of 
institutions. It has been shown that resource-rich countries have higher levels of 
corruption and lower levels of education than non-resource rich countries (Leite and 
Weidmann 1999; Gylfason 2001). 
 
 Impact on conflict. The extraction of natural resources requires little human co-operation 
and tends to be less affected by violent conflicts than manufacturing or service industries, 
because multinational companies can build the necessary infrastructure including access 
roads, they are able to provide their own security and – being enclave economies – they 
rely little on local business linkages. Thus, governments in resource-rich countries have 
less incentive in ensuring economic and political stability. In addition, the prospect of 
gaining control over natural resource revenues may encourage the formation of rebel 
groups and separatist movements. It has been shown that a country’s dependence on 
natural resources dramatically increases the threat of armed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 
1998, 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Keen 1998). 
 
As one expert summarised the fate of oil-exporting countries, “their reality is sobering: 
countries that depend on oil for their livelihood are among the most economically troubled, 
the most authoritarian, and the most conflict-ridden in the world” (Karl 2005), p.21). 
 
Both developing countries such as Nigeria and Venezuela and developed countries such as the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands have suffered from the resource curse; indeed, the word 
“Dutch disease” (relating to the appreciation of a country’s currency exchange rates) 
originally referred to the economic problems caused by natural gas exports in the Netherlands. 
The potential effects of the resource curse were greatest in countries with high dependence on 
oil and gas revenues, such as Algeria and Nigeria (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In most developed economies, the effects of the resource curse were minimised thanks to the 
diversification of the economy and prudent government policy. Furthermore, a small number 
of resource-rich developing countries — in particular, Botswana, Chile, and Malaysia — have 
not only been able to beat the “resource curse” but have achieved high economic growth 
(Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001; Hojman 2002; Usui 1996). The biggest difference between 
successful and unsuccessful resource-rich countries was the quality of governance, which 
ultimately can be attributed to political, social and historical processes behind the formation 
of states (Rosser 2006; Stevens 2005). In successful resource-rich countries, revenues from 
extractive industries exports were utilised to stimulate economic growth elsewhere in the 
economy, while the economy was insulated from “resource curse” effects through 
government policies such as the establishment of a “revenue stabilization” or a “savings fund” 
(Stevens 2005). The differences between successful and less successful countries in terms of 
the local economic impact of the oil and gas sector are enormous. In Brazil and Malaysia, 
about 70% of the goods and services purchased by oil companies is sourced locally; in 
Indonesia and Nigeria, the share of local content is only 25% and 5%, respectively (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2007), p.141).  
 
Given that skilful government policies and appropriate societal institutions can reduce or 
avoid the effects of the resource curse, the key challenge for resource-rich countries is how to 
improve macro-economic and macro-political conditions. In other words, the challenge is how 
to improve wider societal governance. Indeed, a recent United Nations study on extractive 
industries pointed to the “urgent need” of addressing societal governance:  
 
Without a well-developed governance framework, there is an increased risk that 
benefits from extraction will not materialize, that fiscal systems will lead to uneven 
sharing of revenues, that lack of a coherent and concerted development strategy will 
lead to their misuse, that local populations will be left disappointed, and that 
environmental damage, health risk and conflicts will occur. (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 2007), p.96) 
 
Tackling the governance challenge 
 
Oil companies have, until recently, rejected the notion that they should actively address 
macro-level governance issues. Governance in a society is ultimately related to the role of the 
government and companies have been reluctant to become drawn into the sphere of politics. 
As one example, a senior USAID official recounted in a conversation with the author how 
American corporations have been keen on getting involved in various development initiatives 
in education and health, but “for instance, we couldn’t get companies involved in party-
building activities in Zambia”. In the words of one interviewed oil company manager, “we 
cannot be government”. 
 
While the notion of non-involvement in government affairs has not radically changed, a 
number of multinational oil companies including Shell, BP and Statoil now recognise that 
they can play a positive role in strengthening governance. BP in Azerbaijan is arguably by far 
the most wide-ranging attempt by a single company to address governance shortcomings. The 
company has publicly stated that it is prepared to “engage in policymaking processes and 
offer assistance, as appropriate, on the development and implementation of policy agendas, 
which include for consideration addressing poverty alleviation, revenue management, and 
domestic energy” (quoted in (Gulbrandsen and Moe 2007), p.819). BP has cooperated with 
the government of Azerbaijan to facilitate expert advice on the management of the country’s 
State Oil Fund and oil revenues. Furthermore, the company operates a Regional Development 
Initiative to initiate large-scale and cross-regional development interventions in Georgia, 
Turkey and Azerbaijan, with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 
World Bank as partners. Governance is to be improved through “civil society capacity 
building, strengthening the rule of law, and proffering expert advice and assistance” 
(Gulbrandsen and Moe 2007). The initiatives by BP in Azerbaijan are exceptional in a number 
of ways, but a number of multinational companies also profess to contribute to better 
governance.  
 
The author has analysed recent social and environmental reports by twenty oil and gas 
companies to ascertain to what extent they address wider governance issues. The analysis 
covered the reports of ten Western multinational companies (Shell, BP, Chevron, Exxon, 
Statoil, Norsk Hydro, Total, ENI, Repsol and OMV) and ten multinational companies from 
emerging markets (China National Offshore Oil Corporation/CNOOC, China Petroleum & 
Chemical Corporation/Sinopec, Lukoil, Gazprom, MOL, Petrobras, Petronas, PKN Orlen, 
PTT and Sasol).  
 
All of the twenty oil and gas companies address a range of different social and environmental 
responsibilities. As we can see from Table 2, every single company supports some sort of 
“community development” or “social investment”. By implication, every single company 
accepts social responsibilities towards the communities in which it operates. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
In contrast, the commitment of the twenty companies towards addressing governance issues is 
very limited. While eleven companies explicitly state that they address wider governance 
issues, the scope of governance initiatives is extremely narrow. All of the eleven companies 
have largely focused on a single governance issue: revenue transparency, which refers to 
openness and access to information with regards to company payments and government 
revenues from oil, gas and mining. Nine of these companies are based in developed countries. 
Only two out of eleven companies – Brazil’s Petrobras and South Africa’s Sasol – are based 
in emerging markets, which reflects the relative sophistication of these two companies in 
addressing CSR issues (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Revenue transparency is now regarded as the priority initiative to address governance in 
resource-rich countries by policy-makers, the major oil companies and non-government 
organizations. It is assumed that transparency can contribute towards minimizing the effects 
of the resource curse through beneficial political, economic and social effects (see next 
section). The main expected benefit of transparency is the reduction of corruption. Indeed, 
one expert on transparency stated: “The word ‘transparency’ is often used as a synonym for 
the absence of corruption. Transparency is also thought of as a solution or vaccine against 
corruption” (Henriques 2007), p.137). 
 
BP was a pioneering oil company in terms of revenue transparency. In 2001, BP announced 
that it would publish the following information annually on their operations in Angola: total 
net production by oil block; aggregate payments by the company to the state oil corporation 
Sonangol in respect of production-sharing contracts; and total taxes and levies paid by BP to 
the Angolan government as a result of their operations. In the same year, BP disclosed some 
payments that the company made to the government of Azerbaijan. In a further unprecedented 
move, the company published various documents – including production-sharing agreements 
signed with the government of Azerbaijan – on a website in 2002. BP’s actions on 
transparency were hailed as a major step by some non-government organisations (NGOs), 
most notably Global Witness, a London-based NGO which has campaigned for the disclosure 
of such information by oil companies.  
 
However, none of the other major oil companies followed BP’s lead in offering to publish 
their payments to governments. According to interviews, the Angolan government was highly 
displeased by BP’s unilateral decision to publish payments to the government and Angolan 
government officials even threatened to expel BP from the country as a consequence. BP’s 
experience in Angola demonstrated the collective action problem with regards to governance 
initiatives: most companies would benefit from improved governance in host countries, but 
companies may be reluctant to pursue governance initiatives because they may potentially 
suffer individually as a result.  
 
BP’s lesson in Angola partly informed the birth of the Extractive Industry’s Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). The EITI was launched at the initiative of the UK government in 2003 to 
improve the transparency of revenues paid by oil, gas and mining companies to host 
governments, which in turn would limit corruption related to such revenues. The EITI 
describes itself as “a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors and 
international organizations”. Each EITI implementing country commits itself to six EITI 
“criteria”, which include independent audits of all extractive sector payments received by the 
government and a work plan for the government, “including measurable targets, a timetable 
for implementation and an assessment of potential capacity constraints”. As of July 2008, the 
EITI was formally supported by 16 oil and gas companies (Extractive Industry’s 
Transparency Initiative 2008). 
 
A key strength of the initiative was that it would involve all companies in a member country, 
which avoids collective action problems that BP faced in Angola. Another strength was the 
requirement to involve civil society and independent auditors, which helps to properly oversee 
the implementation of the EITI in a given country. 
 
The establishment of a “revenue savings fund” is one example of how revenue transparency 
can help towards reducing “resource curse” effects. For instance, the creation of the State Oil 
Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOFAZ) has to some extent protected the local economy in 
Azerbaijan from extreme currency appreciation and oil price fluctuations, by depositing a part 
of the country’s oil revenues in an overseas account. SOFAZ became (in the words of the 
Economist Intelligence Unit) “the most transparent government body in Azerbaijan” 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2006), p.26). The establishment of SOFAZ was conducive to 
EITI membership and the EITI helps to ensure the publication of annual data on Azerbaijani 
revenue flows. Beating the “resource curse” requires more than just a transparent revenue 
savings fund, but Azerbaijan achieved more in this respect than the majority of other 
resource-rich countries in the past. 
 
The most far-reaching external policy initiative to avoid the pitfalls of the ‘resource curse’ in 
an oil-producing country was the Revenue Management Program in Chad. In 1998, the World 
Bank and the government of Chad have agreed on a program designed to ensure that future oil 
revenues would be used to the benefit of wider society. 10% of Chad’s direct oil revenues 
(dividends and royalties – as opposed to petroleum taxes) were to be placed in a London-
based Future Generations Fund. Of the remainder, 80% of royalties and 85% of dividends 
were to be devoted to priority sectors including education, health and social services, rural 
development and infrastructure. Oil companies were not directly involved. The Chadian 
experiment yielded some positive societal benefits and it helped to insulate the country from 
the “resource curse” for several years (Gould and Winters 2007; Kojucharov 2007). 
 
Potential and Limitations of Transparency 
 
Transparency can contribute towards minimizing the effects of the resource curse, but 
transparency initiatives are relatively young and only few academic studies have been carried 
out until now on the most appropriate use of transparency initiatives and the actual impact of 
transparency. However, extensive quantitative studies that were carried out clearly 
demonstrate to positive development effects of transparency (Alt and Lassen 2006a, b; Gelos 
and Wei 2005; Shi and Svensson 2002). 
 
Benefits of transparency initiatives 
 
There is strong evidence that transparency has positive political, economic and social effects: 
 
 Political Effects. Transparency improves informational flows between the rulers and 
the ruled. It ensures that financial flows are reported to a wide audience in a 
publicly accessible, comprehensive and easily understandable manner. Studies show 
that transparency in revenue and expenditure flows reduces the scope for corruption 
and generating political budget cycles, that means, politicians have less scope to 
overspend budgets at certain times (e.g. during election years) (Alt and Lassen 
2006a,b). In turn, informational flows improve the management of these revenues 
such as through the creation of effective “revenue savings funds” mentioned earlier. 
The political leaders also benefit in that their policies and statements gain higher 
credibility, the reputation and legitimacy of the government and public institutions are 
strengthened, and the relationships with international organizations and aid donors are 
improved.  
 
 Economic Effects. Transparency improves a country’s credibility among foreign 
investors and the international banking community. There is evidence that high-
transparency countries enjoy lower costs of borrowing in sovereign debt markets, and 
investment funds make larger investments in high-transparency countries (Gelos and 
Wei 2005; Glennerster and Shin 2003). Adoption of transparency initiatives can 
therefore contribute to an improved investment climate by providing a clear signal to 
investors and the international financial institutions that the government is committed 
to improved accountability and good governance.  
 
 Social Effects. The positive political and economic effects of transparency can have 
many indirect social effects. By improving the quality of government policy, lowering 
the costs of government investment and attracting foreign capital, transparency 
indirectly results in various positive impacts including contributing to poverty 
reduction. Furthermore, a general climate of transparency empowers civil society 
groups to monitor budget decisions at the micro-level. For instance, transparency can 
improve the effectiveness of health services and reduces health care costs. According 
to Transparency International (2006), central government transparency can encourage 
the development of formal transparency in the health sector such as independent 
audits, release of information about tender processes, dissemination of information 
about costs of procurement and transparency in overseas development aid. Central 
government transparency has therefore role-model effects for other parts of economic 
and public life (Shultz 2004).  
 
Therefore, there is abundant evidence that transparency potentially has many benefits for 
countries that adopt it. Indeed, high-transparency countries consistently perform better than 
low-transparency countries on different measures. One key positive impact, which has been 
studied in some detail, is lower debt accumulation. Statistical analysis by Alt and Lassen 
(2006a and 2006b) clearly shows that high-transparency countries have consistently lower 
government budget deficits and consequently lower debt levels than low-transparency 
countries. Lower debt accumulation is crucial to poverty reduction, given that country 
indebtedness is in itself a cause of poverty. 12 out of the world’s 25 most resource-rich 
countries and 6 of the world’s most oil-rich countries were classified by the World Bank as 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries, displaying some of the worst Human Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2003) p.12). 
 
However, most studies on transparency suggest that a number of conditions must be fulfilled 
in order to maximise the positive impact of transparency. Based on the literature, at least three 
conditions are necessary: (1) free media; (2) involvement of civil society; and (3) timing of 
introducing transparency. In other words, the success of the EITI depends on these three 
conditions, which we shall discuss in the following section. 
 
Conditions for Facilitating Transparency 
 
Based on previous research, the success of transparency initiatives in the oil and gas sector 
depends on the following conditions: 
 
 Media. Evidence suggests that independent media is an important tool for increasing 
accountability and the beneficial effects of transparency (Besley and Prat 2006). Better 
flows of information about revenues and spending allow the public and interest groups 
to observe the causes and effects of fiscal policy and thereby improve political 
accountability. There is anecdotal evidence, for example, that the publication of the 
federation account in Nigeria provided journalists with a powerful tool to scrutinize 
the expenditure of local government authorities and helped to increase accountability. 
The success of EITI depends on reporting revenue flows to a wide audience, and the 
media therefore assist the EITI process.  
 
 Civil society. It has been found that the involvement of private associations and non-
profit organizations is crucial for the success of any anti-corruption and transparency 
initiatives and can be even more important than the role of the media (Rose-
Ackermann 1999), pp.167-171). Watchdog groups such as Transparency International 
or Kazakhstan Revenue Watch have a crucial role to play in monitoring and 
disseminating information, ensuring that larger development goals are pursued, 
influencing policy and training local civil society groups to understand the relevant 
issues. Civil society engagement can have tangible development outcomes. It has been 
reported that the budget allocation for public services (including anti-poverty 
programs) in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta increased from 30% to 68% in the period 
2000-2004, as a direct result of civil society budget advocacy initiatives (Shultz 2004). 
 
 Timing. Experience suggests that once extractive export revenues start flowing, 
“governments find it difficult to avoid a diversion from development projects to 
spending for political advantage” (Bell 2004). Once the government begins to receive 
oil and gas revenues, third parties such as the World Bank and EITI lose much of their 
bargaining power in persuading host governments to adopt principles of good 
governance and transparency (Frynas and Paulo 2007; Gould and Winters 2007). 
Therefore, the potential development benefits of transparency can be maximised, if 
transparency measures are adopted before the start of extractive operations. In 
Azerbaijan and in Chad mentioned earlier, the revenue management initiatives were 
established before the start of the actual oil boom at a time when external actors had 
greater bargaining power. 
 
Therefore, transparency initiatives are unlikely to be successful in autocratic regimes, which 
do not allow a free press and a free civil society. As one author summarised, “the success 
stories in resource revenue management have occurred where there is visionary political 
leadership that understands the need for explicit policies for economic management and 
accountability and where civil society and the media have the capacity to press for good 
governance of resource wealth” (Shankleman 2006). 
 
One of the six EITI “Criteria” stipulates that civil society organizations are involved from the 
outset. However, EITI cannot change the fact that most EITI implementing countries such as 
Azerbaijan or Equatorial Guinea simply do not have free media or a free civil society.  
 
Table 4 uses the 2007 “Political and Civil Freedom” and “Media Freedom” rankings by 
Freedom House – an international organization that compiles “freedom” rankings every year. 
The Freedom House rankings use long checklists for assessing the presence of “freedom”, 
taking into account many different factors ranging from the electoral process, the rule of law, 
property rights to media ownership. While no ranking of this kind can ever be entirely 
objective and value-free, Table 4 provides a simple comparison, which suggests that most oil 
producing countries lack the necessary pre-conditions for the success of transparency. 
 
Table 4 lists the 30 largest oil producing nations in the world. Out of 24 oil producing 
countries in the developing world, only five countries – Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, India and 
Argentina – have “political and civil freedom”, while a number of other countries are 
classified as “partly free”.  Out of these 24 countries, not a single country has a genuinely 
“free press”. Out of seven EITI participants listed in Table 4, not a single country has a 
genuinely “free civil society” or “free press”, while a few countries such as Nigeria are 
classified as “partly free”.  
 
The six largest oil-producing nations from the developed world – the United States, Canada, 
Norway, United Kingdom, Australia and Denmark – have both a “free civil society” and a 
“free press”. Indeed, previous studies that found positive effects of transparency have often 
focused on developed countries (Alt and Lassen 2006a and 2006b; Besley and Prat 2006). In 
contrast, all EITI participants are developing countries and there is no research to demonstrate 
that the EITI actually helped to bring any positive political, economic and social benefits to 
member countries (see the following section). 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
By implication, the optimism over the adoption of transparency initiatives by developing 
countries is, at best, exaggerated and, at worst, misguided. The pre-conditions for the success 
of the EITI are simply not present in countries such as Azerbaijan and Equatorial Guinea. 
Indeed, after more than seven years since the launch of the EITI,Azerbaijan is one of only two 
countries that have so far complied with EITI criteria (the other is Liberia) and Azerbaijan’s 
record on government spending has not improved (see below). .  
 
The World Bank-led Revenue Management Program in Chad mentioned earlier ultimately 
failed. While the programme yielded some economic and social benefits, academic research 
has demonstrated that it fell far short of the expected outcomes (Gould and Winters 2007; 
Kojucharov 2007; Pegg 2006). From the start, it became clear that the programme had 
shortcomings, and the Chadian government was able to divert some earmarked funds towards 
other purposes. In 2006, Chad’s agreement with the World Bank was renegotiated and 
watered down, and the ‘Future Generations Fund’ was scrapped, as President Idriss Deby 
demanded more access to the country’s oil revenues in order to purchase weapons for use 
against his enemies. There have been suggestions that the actions of oil companies further 
undermined the World Bank’s efforts; after threats from the Chadian government in 2006, the 
US company Chevron and the Malaysian company Petronas agreed to pay undisclosed sums 
to the government which escaped the Revenue Management Program. Finally, the World 
Bank withdrew from the Revenue Management Program in September 2008, stating that 
“Regrettably, it became evident that the arrangements that had underpinned the Bank’s 
involvement in the Chad/Cameroon pipeline project were not working” (World Bank 2008). 
 
A frequently cited reason for the problems of the World Bank program in Chad was timing. 
On the one hand, Chad’s government had more bargaining power in 2006 than in 2003 thanks 
to the inflow of oil revenues; thus, it was in a position to re-negotiate previous agreements. 
On the other hand, the World Bank failed to effectively create the mechanisms for overseeing 
the use of oil revenues (including a strong and well-resourced oversight committee) before the 
start of oil production in 2003. While World Bank officials emphasized the importance of 
“sequencing” (that means, encouraging capacity building before allowing oil infrastructure 
construction), pipeline construction already started four months after project approval and oil 
production started one year ahead of schedule. In effect, neither the project oversight 
committee nor Chad’s government institutions were effectively prepared for the inflow of oil 
revenues, nor were the rules for handling oil revenues effectively established. One observer 
noted in 2007: “Nearly seven years into the project and four years since the first batch of oil 
exports, Chad, the World Bank, and the oil consortium are still trying to negotiate the rules 
and mechanisms for calculating and distributing oil revenues” (quoted in (Kojucharov 2007), 
p.488).  
  
In more general terms, the problem of timing implies that third parties such as the World 
Bank and the EITI have even less leverage in established oil producing countries compared 
with Chad. In established oil producing countries (particularly in those countries undergoing 
an oil boom), the government is less dependent on external aid and loans, it can obtain oil-
backed loans from international banks and it can obtain unconditional loans and aid from new 
actors including the government of China. In other words, the government can escape 
externally imposed conditions by the World Bank and other third parties. As the author has 
previously argued, it is no coincidence that many oil producing countries such as Equatorial 
Guinea managed to defy the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 
different ways for a long time (Frynas 2004). 
 
In addition to the three conditions identified above, the EITI initiative has inherent limitations, 
which we shall discuss in the next section. 
 
Limitations of the EITI 
 
Notwithstanding the existing conditions for success, the design and remit of the EITI also 
have inherent limitations. Above all, the EITI focuses on revenues, not spending.  
 
Effective EITI implementation helps to reveal how much a government has earned from oil 
and gas, but this does not necessarily help to increase the accountability of government 
spending. For instance, while the Economist Intelligence Unit praised the accountability of 
SOFAZ (the revenue savings fund in Azerbaijan), it pointed out: “International financial 
institutions have expressed concern that, although management of SOFAZ has proved 
relatively transparent, that accountability is lost once the funds are transferred for use into the 
state budget” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2006), p.26). In the words of one recent study on 
Azerbaijan, “The main weakness of EITI is the lack of reporting and monitoring of the 
government’s spending of oil revenues” (Gulbrandsen and Moe 2007), p.822). 
 
Existing empirical evidence on the positive effects of transparency relates to how the money 
is spent, not how it is earned. All of the positive effects of transparency mentioned earlier – 
ranging from increased foreign investments to decreased corruption in the health service – 
relate to the scrutiny of government spending and not the scrutiny of government revenues. 
 
Indeed, the premise of the EITI that revenue transparency provides benefits for implementing 
countries and investors is unproven and speculative, given that existing research focused on 
government spending – not revenue transparency. Studies on transparency that found positive 
benefits of transparency focused on the transparency of spending and actual outcomes of 
spending. Previous research measured the transparency of individual countries according to 
quantitative indicators such as macroeconomic forecasts (Gelos and Wei 2005), the 
publication of IMF reports on the macroeconomic performance of countries (Glennerster and 
Shin 2003) and the quality of government budget documentation (Alt and Lassen 2006). All 
of these studies imply that the quality of decision-making on spending is crucial, in terms of 
complying with international norms and accounting standards, publication and independent 
verification of government budgets, and the actual outcomes of decision-making. Not a single 
study quoted earlier focused specifically on the transparency of revenues; indeed, there 
appears to be an assumption among researchers that transparency of revenues is a secondary 
concern. In summary, there is no scientific basis for the assertion that revenue transparency 
leads to better social or economic outcomes. 
 
Lessons from successful resource-rich countries further suggest that the quality of government 
spending provides the key to addressing governance challenges. It has been found that the 
economic success of resource-rich countries such as Botswana, Indonesia, Malaysia and Chile 
had a common characteristic: prudence in spending extractive revenues. A study by Paul 
Stevens graphically portrayed the approach of successful countries: 
 
When money was spent, it went on productive activities.  Conspicuous consumption 
and gigantomania were constrained although not entirely absent.  Much of the revenue 
trickled down to the private sector boosting savings and investment. (Stevens 2005) 
 
Prudent spending was supported by government policies that helped to insulate countries from 
the negative effects of the resource curse such as “revenue stabilization” funds, and policies 
that helped to stimulate the private sector in other parts of the economy. As a result, these 
countries have been able to grow other economic sectors, in particular, manufacturing. 
Statistics demonstrate that the per capita GDP growth in non-resource sectors was high in the 
four countries mentioned above (Stevens 2005).  
 
The EITI initiative is unlikely to duplicate the success of Botswana or Chile because it does 
little or nothing to improve the quality of government spending. From this perspective, policy 
initiatives by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have greater 
likelihood of success precisely because they deal with government spending. The World Bank 
initiative in Chad focused on spending, as we mentioned earlier. Similarly, the IMF 
encourages the publication of country reports that deal with broader transparency and the 
quality of governance in government finances; these include Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSCs) which summarise the respective countries’ observance of 
standards and codes related to auditing, banking supervision, corporate governance, and 
monetary and financial policy transparency, among others. Indeed, one quantitative study on 
transparency specifically found that the publication of IMF reports such as ROSCs contributes 
towards better informed markets and lower costs of borrowing for governments in 
participating countries (Glennerster and Shin 2003). In contrast to the World Bank and the 
IMF, the EITI does not deal with issues of wider transparency and governance of public 
finances and is unlikely to yield similar positive results. 
 
World Bank/IMF approaches also have limitations because they are externally imposed, thus 
they may suffer from the lack of societal support and involvement, and they may lack 
legitimacy for influencing sovereign nations. But, in the face of limitations of the EITI, the 
World Bank and the IMF may offer alternative mechanisms for improving governance in 
resource-rich countries. Indeed, in April 2008, the World Bank President Robert Zoellick 
announced a new initiative to help developing countries manage their natural resource 
revenues. The initiative labelled “The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Plus Plus” 
(EITI++) goes beyond the EITI by offering resource-rich countries World Bank assistance in 
designing contracts, monitoring operations, collecting taxes and, above all, spending the 
revenues effectively. While details on the new initiative are still scarce at the time of writing, 
the World Bank initiative has potentially more merits than the current corporate and policy 
agenda on governance. 
 
In addition to its narrow focus, one key dilemma of the EITI is that (in the words of one and 
gas sector insider) it “shifted the responsibility back to government”. The EITI focuses on the 
cooperation between the UK government and host governments in developing countries; the 
initiative does not assign an active role to oil, gas and mining companies in improving 
governance. The failure to assign a clearer role to companies constrains the pressure on host 
governments, because the UK government or the World Bank sometimes have less influence 
over host governments than the multinational companies.  
 
In summary, the main governance initiative in the oil and gas sector – the EITI – has serious 
shortcomings and is unlikely to duplicate the success stories of countries such as Botswana or 
Chile. It also fails to draw on the companies’ resources in influencing governments, which we 
discuss in the next section. 
 
Undermining governance through corporate activity 
 
Most oil company executives tend to reject the notion that they could play a constructive role 
in helping to address governance failures and they have a legitimate concern over corporate 
involvement in the political process. However, such a stance denies the reality that (1) 
multinational companies already intervene in the political process to attain corporate 
objectives (e.g. lobbying for new legislation) (Shaffer and Hillman 2000; Frynas, Mellahi, and 
Pigman 2006); (2) corporate activities such as tax avoidance and lobbying may be 
contributing to governance failures (Utting 2007; Henriques 2007); and (3) under certain 
circumstances, multinational companies may benefit commercially from governance failures 
in developing countries (e.g. non-enforcement of certain government regulations or the ability 
of companies to negotiate more profitable agreements with governments) (Frynas 1998). 
 
It has been suggested that the most effective business method for influencing political 
outcomes is collective action through organized interest groups. A vast literature demonstrates 
the impact of business interest groups on policy making (Schattschneider 1935; Olson 1965; 
Mitnick 1993). In addition, companies use many different methods of political influence, 
including political donations, public relations and expert advice, which can yield them many 
business benefits including corporate influence over government policies, better information 
and reduced uncertainty (Keim and Zeithaml 1986; Getz 1993; Hillman and Hitt 1999). 
 
Oil companies are members of interest groups including industry associations such as the 
American Petroleum Institute, single issue groups such as the Global Climate Coalition and 
cross-industry lobbying groups such as the European Round Table of Industrialists, which in 
turn influence government policies. In line with the influential theory of collective action 
(Olson 1965), oil companies are likely to have high political power because there is a 
relatively small number of big players in the industry that wield high economic power. Thus, 
the American Petroleum Institute is more influential than, for instance, a small business 
association. Large multinational oil companies are also powerful enough to single-handedly 
affect political outcomes in a country. At the extreme, a single company that has a dominant 
economic position in a country can be particularly influential, as exemplified by BP in 
Azerbaijan discussed earlier. Companies often use that influence to attain corporate goals. 
Previous research by the author points to the competitive advantages that oil companies can 
strategically draw from the political process (Frynas 1998; Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman 
2006).  
 
Firms are able to influence the institutions that affect them not only through involvement in 
the political process, but also through influencing technical standards, sources of funding or 
the media. For instance, in technical committees, sub-committees and working groups of the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), representatives of interest groups 
including firms and consumer bodies are treated as equal partners in shaping the agenda of the 
ISO. Among other things, multinational companies actively worked on developing the new 
ISO26000 CSR standard. Indeed, an oil company manager from Exxon – W. James Bover – 
became chairman of ISO’s technical committee on petroleum products and lubricants.1 The 
example of the ISO may thus help to partly explain the corporate preference for voluntary 
agreements rather than formal government regulation, which allows firms to negotiate 
relatively favourable standards. In addition to the ISO, business lobby groups have played a 
formal role in a number of important international fora, which allowed them to gain influence 
over the political process related to social and environmental issues (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
At this point, it should not necessarily be assumed that the use of influence by oil companies 
has automatically a negative impact. Indeed, corporate political activities can encourage 
higher social, environmental and governance standards. For instance, it has been shown that 
lobbying by firms can help towards more stringent environmental regulations (McWilliams, 
Van Fleet, and Cory 2002).  
 
However, the actions of companies often have negative political consequences. It has been 
argued, for instance, that oil companies in Azerbaijan “have (inadvertently at times) backed 
the Aliev government’s intimidation of dissidents through outright bribery, patronizing only 
government-favoured media or businesses, and eschewing extended contacts with the political 
opposition” (Chen 2007), p.43). A suggestion of a meeting with opposition politicians in 
Azerbaijan was met with “less than no interest” by the oil companies (Gulbrandsen and Moe 
2005), p.59). One scholar noted that: “the warm and cozy relations of the Azerbaijani 
government with trans-national oil companies ensure the flow of funds at the expense of state 
and democracy building in the country” (Valiyev 2006), quoted in (Chen 2007), p.44.).  
                                                 
1
 For the list of technical committees, see the ISO website at http://www.iso.ch/meme/memento.html (accessed 
12 November 2000 and 7 June 2006). 
 In many oil producing countries such as Libya and Venezuela, oil revenues have been shown 
to prolong authoritarian rule (Vandewalle 1998; Karl 1997). For instance, it is no coincidence 
that some of Africa’s longest serving heads of state come from oil producing countries, 
including Bongo in Gabon (the country’s President since 1967), Dos Santos in Angola (since 
1979), Obiang in Equatorial Guinea (since 1979) and Qadaffi in Libya (since 1969). Indeed, 
statistical analysis conducted by Michael Ross on 113 countries over the period 1971-1997 
provided evidence that oil and gas exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule. In 
general terms, the study suggested that extractive exports concentrated in the hands of a 
relatively small number of actors have anti-democratic effects, while – for instance - more 
“decentralized” agricultural exports have not. Michael Ross concluded that “the oil-impedes-
democracy claim is both valid and statistically robust” (Ross 2001), p.356). 
 
Corporate political activities may also have a negative impact through influencing social 
policy. As Peter Utting of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development has 
pointed out, companies often use their political power to advance causes that have negative 
consequences, such as weakening of labour rights, tax avoidance or privatisation of basic 
services. The author noted:  
 
Many of the world’s largest corporations and business associations actively promote 
CSR while simultaneously lobbying forcefully for macroeconomic, labour market and 
other social policies associated with forms of labour market flexibilisation, 
deregulation, and fiscal ‘reform’ that can result in the weakening of institutions and 
systems of social protection. (Utting 2007), p.701) 
 
Whether they are a force for good or bad, companies clearly use political influence, which in 
turn affects governance. Therefore, the controversy is not merely about the legitimacy of 
firms to influence government but rather about the actual manner of using political influence 
and about the transparency of firms regarding their political activities. Even if companies 
have done nothing wrong, by not disclosing their corporate lobbying activities, they open 
themselves up to allegations that they may have something to hide about their political 
involvement or that they only intervene in the political process when it suits them. 
 
A leading recent book on corporate transparency suggests that even the most transparent 
companies remain less than open about topics such as corruption and lobbying. The book 
notes: “The extent of voluntary disclosure of lobbying activities by companies is very limited, 
to the extent that currently it is rare to find any voluntary reporting on lobbying expenditure or 
activities” (Henriques 2007), p.154). Company reporting on corruption is also very limited, 
even by companies with highly developed codes of conduct. Henriques (2007) specifically 
points to the examples of Shell and BP. Shell, for instance, limits their corruption reporting to 
the number of “violations” explicitly reported to the Audit Committee of the Board of Royal 
Dutch/Shell, and providing specific figures for Nigeria. However, as Henriques points out, the 
company fails to report on the nature of legal prosecutions, the use of agents or whistle-
blowing – all of which are crucial to understanding both the problem of corruption and the 
company’s ability to deal with the problem.  
 
A 2008 report by Transparency International on the oil and gas sector supports the general 
findings by Henriques. The report analysed 42 leading oil companies (both multinationals and 
domestic state-owned companies) in 21 countries of operation with regards to revenue 
transparency. The report suggested that the exclusive focus on the reporting on payments to 
governments is not sufficient to generating a climate of transparency. It stated: 
 Revenue transparency by oil and gas companies is comprised of more than just 
reporting on payments to home governments on a country-by-country basis. It also 
requires disclosure of operations data and anti-corruption programmes both of which 
support such transparency and enable its sustainability by the company. 
 
The key finding of the Transparency International report was that the majority of the 42 
analysed companies “do not make sufficient efforts to report on their payments to host 
governments on a country-by country basis or to disclose the accompanying information on 
their operations and anti-corruption programmes” (Transparency International 2008), p.24). 
 
Therefore, while companies publicly support transparency, they appear only to select a few 
areas for openness and they continue to be secretive about other areas. Indeed, CSR reporting 
and “transparency initiatives” play a key role in influencing the media and public opinion 
because they help to portray firms as responsible citizens that care about people and the 
environment more than about profits. As one study pointed out a long time ago, the influence 
of interest groups may indeed be greatest when “disguised as altruistic, nonpartisan or 
patriotic interest” (Ray 1972), which can in turn help towards (to borrow from the vocabulary 
of Jürgen Habermas) “procurement of legitimation”. Reporting on CSR lends itself perfectly 
to positively influence external perceptions because it helps to disguise the real self interest of 
firms. Henriques (2007, 150) commented that it is ironic that CSR or sustainability reports 
“were originally conceived as mechanisms for companies to demonstrate that they were being 
influenced by their stakeholders, rather than vehicles for the opposite”. 
 
In summary, companies use political influence to attain corporate goals related to profit-
maximization, but they rarely use that influence to encourage improvements in governance. 
While CSR initiatives largely fail to encourage better governance, corporate activities may 




This article has demonstrated that governance remains the main challenge for extractive 
industries. Yet this article has also demonstrated that the current CSR agenda barely addresses 
governance issues; indeed, corporate actions may contribute to governance failures. One 
exception is transparency of payments to host governments, which has been supported by a 
number of multinational companies. This article pointed to abundant evidence that 
transparency can potentially yield many positive effects – ranging from increased foreign 
investment to decreased corruption in health services. However, the effectiveness of the main 
transparency initiative supported by oil and gas companies – the EITI – is severely 
constrained. On the one hand, most oil-producing countries lack the conditions for the success 
of transparency initiatives. On the other hand, the EITI is constrained by its own focus on 
revenue transparency – as opposed to transparency of government spending. Indeed, there is 
no scientific basis for the premise of the EITI that revenue transparency leads to better social 
or economic outcomes. 
 
 
Current CSR initiatives do not address the question of how multinational companies can be 
usefully integrated into improving governance. The author believes that companies have a 
role to play in better governance in the countries where they operate. As this article has 
suggested, multinational companies are political actors already and they use their influence to 
pursue corporate objectives. In many countries ranging from Equatorial Guinea to Azerbaijan, 
Exxon or BP has more influence than the World Bank or other external actors. At the very 
least, multinational companies could use this influence to persuade governments to sign up to 
the EITI and the EITI++ initiative, to publish Reports on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSCs) or to spend a greater portion of oil revenues on health and education. At the 
moment, companies continue to neglect the macro-level problems in their industry and the 
related governance issues.  
 
 
The contention is not that a single company should accept the responsibility for the wider 
societal impact of corporate activities. Rather, the unwillingness of both companies and 
governments to face up to governance challenges (such as the reality of the “resource curse” 
in oil-producing countries) constrains the CSR agenda. In simple words: if CSR practitioners 
do not acknowledge the source of a problem, it may be difficult to consider the most 
appropriate solutions for it.  
 
In conclusion, CSR debates appear to have marginalized debates on governance and macro-
level solutions to complex society-wide problems. There is a real danger that a narrow focus 
on CSR, local community projects or narrow policy initiatives such as the EITI may divert 
attention from broader political, economic and social solutions for such problems (cf. Frynas 
2005; Blowfield and Frynas 2005). 
References 
 
Alt, James E., and David Dreyer Lassen: 2006, ‘Transparency, Political Polarization, and 
Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries’, American Journal of Political Science 
50(3), 530-550. 
Alt, James E., and David Dreyer Lassen: 2006, ‘Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, and 
Debt in OECD Countries’, European Economic Review 50(6), 1403-1439. 
Bell, Joseph, et al.: 2004, ‘Sao Tome and Principe Oil Revenue Management Law - Oil-
Revenue Management Team of the Columbia University Consulting Group to H.E. 
The President of Sao Tome and Principe’, (Columbia University, New York). 
Besley, Timothy, and Andrea Prat: 2006, ‘Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture 
and Government Accountability’, American Economic Review 96(3), 720-736. 
Blowfield, Michael, and Jedrzej George Frynas: 2005, ‘Editorial: Setting New Agendas - 
Critical Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility in the Developing World’, 
International Affairs 81(3), 499-513. 
Chen, Matthew E.: 2007, ‘National Oil Companies and Corporate Citizenship: A Survey of 
Transnational Policy and Practice’ (The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 
Rice University, Houston, TX). 
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler: 1998, ‘On the Economic Causes of Civil War’, Oxford 
Economic Papers 50, 563-573. 
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler: 2000, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Policy Research 
Working Paper No.2355 (World Bank, Washington, DC). 
Corden, W.M.: 1984, ‘Booming sector and Dutch disease economics: Survey and 
consolidation’, Oxford Economic Papers 36, 359-380. 
Economist Intelligence Unit: 2006, ‘Country Profile 2006 - Azerbaijan’ (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, London). 
Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Nicholas Sambanis: 2000, ‘Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in 
Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict’, Journal of African 
Economies 9(3), 244-269. 
Extractive Industry’s Transparency Initiative (EITI): 2008, EITI website at 
http://eitransparency.org/ (accessed 18 July 2008). 
Frynas, Jedrzej George: 1998, ‘Political Instability and Business: Focus on Shell in Nigeria’, 
Third World Quarterly 19(3), 457-479. 
Frynas, Jedrzej George: 2004, ‘The Oil Boom in Equatorial Guinea’, African Affairs 
103(413), 527-546. 
Frynas, Jedrzej George: 2005, ‘The False Developmental Promise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Evidence from Multinational Oil Companies’, International Affairs 
81(3), 581-598. 
Frynas, Jedrzej George: 2008, ‘Corporate social responsibility and international development: 
critical assessment’, Corporate Governance: An International Review 16(4), 274-281. 
Frynas, Jedrzej George, Kamel  Mellahi, and Geoffrey Pigman: 2006, ‘First Mover 
Advantages in International Business and Firm-Specific Political Resources’, Strategic 
Management Journal 27, 321-345. 
Frynas, Jedrzej George, and Manuel Paulo: 2007, ‘A New Scramble for African Oil? 
Historical, political, and business perspectives’, African Affairs 106(423), 229-251. 
Gelb, Alan et al.: 1988. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or curse (Oxford University Press, New 
York). 
Gelos, Gaston, and Shang-Jin Wei: 2005, ‘Transparency and International Portfolio 
Holdings’, Journal of Finance 60(6), 2987-3020. 
Getz, Kathleen A.: 1993, ‘Selecting Corporate Political Tactics’, in B. M. Mitnick (eds.), 
Corporate Political Agency: The Construction of Competition in Public Affairs (Sage, 
Newbury Park). 
Glennerster, Rachel, and Yongseok Shin: 2003, ‘Is transparency good for you, and can the 
IMF help?’ (International Monetary Fund, Washington DC). 
Gould, John A., and Matthew S. Winters: 2007, ‘An Obsolescing Bargain in Chad: Shifts in 
leverage between the government and the World Bank’, Business & Politics 9(2), 1-
34. 
Gulbrandsen, Lars H., and Arild Moe: 2005, ‘Oil company CSR collaboration in "new" petro-
states’, Journal of Corporate Citizenship (20), 1-12. 
Gulbrandsen, Lars H., and Arild Moe: 2007, ‘BP in Azerbaijan: A test case of the potential 
and limits of the CSR agenda?’, Third World Quarterly 28(4), 813-830. 
Gylfason, Thorvaldur: 2001, ‘Natural resources, education and economic development’, 
European Economic Review 45, 847-859. 
Henriques, Adrian: 2007, Corporate Truth - The Limits to Transparency (Earthscan, London). 
Heywood, Andrew: 2002, Politics, 2
nd
 edition (Palgrave, Houndmills). 
Hillman, Amy J., and Michael A. Hitt: 1999, ‘Corporate Political Strategy Formulation: A 
Model of Approach, Participation, and Strategy Decisions’, Academy of Management 
Review 24(4), 825-842. 
Hojman, D.E.: 2002, ‘The political economy of Chile's fast economic growth: An Olsonian 
interpretation’, Public Choice 111(1/2), 155-178. 
Karl, Terry L.: 1997, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (University of 
California Press, Berkeley, CA). 
Karl, Terry L.: 2005, ‘Understanding the Resource Curse’, in S. Tsalik and A. Schiffrin (eds.) 
Covering Oil (Open Society Institute, New York). 
Keen, David: 1998, ‘The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars’, in Adelphi Paper 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford). 
Keim, Gerald D., and Carl P. Zeithaml: 1986, ‘Corporate Political Strategy and Legislative 
Decision Making: A Review and Contingency Approach’, Academy of Management 
Review 11(4), 828-843. 
Kojucharov, Nikola: 2007, ‘Poverty, Petroleum & Policy Intervention: Lessons from the 
Chad-Cameroon Pipeline’, Review of African Political Economy 34(113), 477-496. 
Leite, Carlos, and Jens Weidmann: 1999, ‘Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, 
Corruption and Economic Growth’ (International Monetary Fund, Washington DC). 
MacDonald, Kate: 2007, ‘Globalising Justice within Coffee Supply Chains? Fair Trade, 
Starbucks and the transformation of supply chain governance’, Third World Quarterly 
28(4), 793–812. 
McWilliams, Abagail, D.D. Van Fleet, and K.D. Cory: 2002, ‘Raising Rivals' Costs Through 
Political Strategy: An Extension of Resource-Based Theory’, Journal of Management 
Studies 39(5), 707-723. 
Mitnick, Barry M., (ed.): 1993, Corporate Political Agency: The Construction of Competition 
in Public Affairs (Sage, Newbury Park). 
Olson, Mancur: 1965, The Logic of Collective Action - Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA). 
Pegg, Scott: 2006, ‘Can policy intervention beat the resource curse? Evidence from the Chad-
Cameroon pipeline project’, African Affairs 105(418), 1-25. 
Ray, Dennis M.: 1972, ‘Corporations and American Foreign Relations’, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 403 (September), 80-92. 
Rose-Ackermann, Susan: 1999, Corruption and Government (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge). 
Ross, Michael L.: 1999, ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse’, World Politics 
51(2), 297-322. 
Ross, Michael L.: 2001, ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’, World Politics 53(3), 325-361. 
Rosser, Andrew: 2006, ‘Escaping the Resource Curse’, New Political Economy 11(4), 557-
570. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner: 1999, ‘The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms 
and Growth’, Journal of Development Economics 59(1), 43-76. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner: 2001, ‘Natural Resources and Economic 
Development: The Curse of Natural Resources’, European Economic Review 45, 827-
838. 
Sarraf, Maria, and Moortaza Jiwanji: 2001, ‘Beating the resource curse: The case of 
Botswana’ (The World Bank, Washington DC). 
Schattschneider, E.E.: 1935, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff - A study of free enterprise in 
pressure politics as shown in the 1939-1930 revision of the tariff (Prentice Hall, New 
York). 
Shaffer, Brian, and Amy J. Hillman: 2000, ‘The development of business–government 
strategies by diversified firms’, Strategic Management Journal 21(2), 175–190. 
Shankleman, Jill: 2006, ‘Managing Natural Resource Wealth’ (United States Institute of 
Peace, Washington DC). 
Shi, Min, and Jakob Svensson: 2002, ‘Conditional Political Budget Cycles’ (Stockholm). 
Shultz, Jim: 2004, ‘Follow the money - A guide to monitoring budgets and oil and gas 
revenues’ (Open Society Institute, New York). 
Stevens, Paul: 2005, ‘Resource curse and how to avoid it’, Journal of Energy and 
Development 31(1), 1-20. 
Tallontire, Anne: 2007, ‘Who Regulates the Agri-food Chain? Towards a framework for 
understanding private standards initiatives’, Third World Quarterly 28(4), 775-791. 
Transparency International: 2006, Global Corruption Report 2006 (Pluto Press, London). 
Transparency International: 2008, ‘Promoting Revenue Transparency - 2008 Report on 
Revenue Transparency of Oil and Gas Companies’ (Transparency International, 
Berlin). 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: 2007, ‘World Investment Report - 
Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development’ (United Nations, 
New York and Geneva). 
Usui, N.: 1996, ‘Policy adjustments to the oil boom and their evaluation: The Dutch Disease 
in Indonesia’, World Development 24(5), 887-900. 
Utting, Peter: 2007, ‘CSR and Equality’, Third World Quarterly 28(4), 697-712. 
Valiyev, Anar M.: 2006, ‘Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan: A Failed Revolution’, 
Problems of Post-Communism 53(3), 17-35. 
Vandewalle, Dirk: 1998, Libya since Independence - Oil and State-Building (Cornell 
University Press, New York). 
World Bank: 2003, ‘Striking a better balance: The World Bank Group and extractive 
industries - Final report of the Extractive Industries Review Vol.1.’ (World Bank, 
Washington DC). 
World Bank: 2008, ‘World Bank Statement on Chad-Cameroon Pipeline’, Press Release 
No:2009/073/AFR, 9 September (World Bank, Washington DC). 
 
 Table 1: Countries with highest dependence on oil and gas exports (per cent of total 
exports, 5-year average), 2000-2004 
 
Country Per cent of total exports Product description 
Algeria 97.8 Oil and gas 
Nigeria 97.8 Oil 
Libya 96.9 Oil 
Yemen 93.3 Oil and gas 
Kuwait 92.9 Oil 
Angola 92.2 Oil 
Qatar 89.1 Oil, petrochemicals 
Saudi Arabia 88.9 Oil 
Brunei 88.3 Oil 
Azerbaijan 86.6 Oil 
Iran 86.3 Oil and gas 
Venezuela 83.4 Oil 
Turkmenistan 81.0 Gas 
Oman 80.6 Oil 
Gabon 79.5 Oil 
Sudan 74.2 Oil 
Syria 72.8 Oil 
Bahrain 70.5 Oil 
Trinidad and Tobago 61.3 Oil and gas 
Kazakhstan 56.1 Oil and gas 
Source: (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2007), p.87. 
Table 2: Community Investments by Selected Oil Companies in 2006 
 
Company Country 2006 
spending 
(US$ million) 
Community Investment by Focus Area 








BP UK 107 + + + + 
Shell UK 140 + + + + 
Chevron USA 91 + + + + 
Exxon USA 138 + + + + 
Statoil Norway 10 + + + + 
Norsk Hydro* Norway 45  + +  
Total* France 156 + + + + 
ENI* Italy 98 + + + + 
Repsol* Spain 34 + + +  
OMV Austria n/a + + +  
CNOOC China n/a  + +  
Sinopec China n/a + +   
Lukoil  Russia 62 + +   
Gazprom Russia n/a + +   
MOL Hungary n/a + +   
Petrobras* Brazil 255 + + + + 
Petronas Malaysia n/a + + +  
PKN Orlen Poland n/a + +   
PTT Thailand n/a + + +  
Sasol South Africa n/a + + + + 
* 2006 spending figure converted from local currency into US dollars, using currency exchange rates from 
the Economist magazine for 31 December 2006 
 
Table 3: Support for Revenue Transparency by Selected Oil Companies in 2006 
 





BP UK + + 
Shell UK + + 
Chevron USA + + 
Exxon USA + + 
Statoil Norway + + 
Norsk Hydro Norway + + 
Total France + + 
ENI Italy + + 
Repsol Spain + + 
OMV Austria   
CNOOC China   
Sinopec China   
Lukoil  Russia   
Gazprom Russia   
MOL Hungary   
Petrobras Brazil + + 
Petronas Malaysia   
PKN Orlen Poland   
PTT Thailand   
Sasol South Africa +  
 
 
Table 4: Civil Liberties & Media Freedom in Largest Oil-producing Countries in 2007 
Country Oil Production 
(thousand barrels 
per day) 
EITI    
Participant 
Political and Civil 
Freedom 
Media Freedom 
United States 6895  + + 
Canada  3041  + + 
Norway 2968  + + 
United Kingdom 1809  + + 
Australia 554  + + 
Denmark 377  + + 
Saudi Arabia 11114    
Russia 9552    
Iran 4267    
Mexico 3760  + ± 
China 3627    
Venezuela 2937  ±  
United Arab E. 2751    
Kuwait 2643  ± ± 
Nigeria 2580 + ± ± 
Algeria 2016    
Iraq 1833    
Libya 1751    
Brazil 1715  + ± 
Kazakhstan 1356 +   
Angola 1233    
Indonesia 1128  + ± 
Qatar 1045    
India 784  + ± 
Oman 779    
Malaysia 767  ±  
Argentina 725  + ± 
Egypt 696    
Colombia 554  ± ± 
Ecuador 541  ± ± 
Syria 458    
Azerbaijan 452 +   
Yemen 426 + ±  
Vietnam 398    
Equatorial Guinea 356 +   
Sudan 355    
Thailand 265   ± 
Rep. of Congo 246 +  ± 
Gabon 234 + ±  
Brunei 206    
+ free   
± partly free 
Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007; Freedom House “Freedom in the World 2007” and 
“Freedom of the Press 2007” surveys at www.freedomhouse.org (accessed 20 March 2008). 
Table 5: Level of formal access for business interest groups 
 
Level of access Method of access Example 
High official function ISO standards 
 advisory function US delegation in GATT 
Moderate consultation  Kyoto Protocol 
 expression of opinion    World Bank Extractive Industries Review 
Low no access  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
